Friday, October 8, 2010

An Investing Principles Checklist

An Investing Principles Checklist
from Poor Charlie’s Almanack
Risk – All investment evaluations should begin by measuring risk, especially reputational
􀂃 Incorporate an appropriate margin of safety
􀂃 Avoid dealing with people of questionable character
􀂃 Insist upon proper compensation for risk assumed
􀂃 Always beware of inflation and interest rate exposures
􀂃 Avoid big mistakes; shun permanent capital loss
Independence – “Only in fairy tales are emperors told they are naked”
􀂃 Objectivity and rationality require independence of thought
􀂃 Remember that just because other people agree or disagree with you doesn’t make you right or wrong – the only thing that matters is the correctness of your analysis and judgment
􀂃 Mimicking the herd invites regression to the mean (merely average performance)
Preparation – “The only way to win is to work, work, work, work, and hope to have a few insights”
􀂃 Develop into a lifelong self-learner through voracious reading; cultivate curiosity and strive to become a little wiser every day
􀂃 More important than the will to win is the will to prepare
􀂃 Develop fluency in mental models from the major academic disciplines
􀂃 If you want to get smart, the question you have to keep asking is “why, why, why?”
Intellectual humility – Acknowledging what you don’t know is the dawning of wisdom
􀂃 Stay within a well-defined circle of competence
􀂃 Identify and reconcile disconfirming evidence
􀂃 Resist the craving for false precision, false certainties, etc.
􀂃 Above all, never fool yourself, and remember that you are the easiest person to fool
“Understanding both the power of compound interest and the difficulty of getting it is the heart and soul of understanding a lot of things.”
Analytic rigor – Use of the scientific method and effective checklists minimizes errors and omissions
􀂃 Determine value apart from price; progress apart from activity; wealth apart from size
􀂃 It is better to remember the obvious than to grasp the esoteric
􀂃 Be a business analyst, not a market, macroeconomic, or security analyst
􀂃 Consider totality of risk and effect; look always at potential second order and higher level impacts
􀂃 Think forwards and backwards – Invert, always invert
Allocation – Proper allocation of capital is an investor’s number one job
􀂃 Remember that highest and best use is always measured by the next best use (opportunity cost)
􀂃 Good ideas are rare – when the odds are greatly in your favor, bet (allocate) heavily
􀂃 Don’t “fall in love” with an investment – be situation-dependent and opportunity-driven
Patience – Resist the natural human bias to act
􀂃 “Compound interest is the eighth wonder of the world” (Einstein); never interrupt it unnecessarily
􀂃 Avoid unnecessary transactional taxes and frictional costs; never take action for its own sake
􀂃 Be alert for the arrival of luck
􀂃 Enjoy the process along with the proceeds, because the process is where you live
Decisiveness – When proper circumstances present themselves, act with decisiveness and conviction
􀂃 Be fearful when others are greedy, and greedy when others are fearful
􀂃 Opportunity doesn’t come often, so seize it when it comes
􀂃 Opportunity meeting the prepared mind; that’s the game
Change – Live with change and accept unremovable complexity
􀂃 Recognize and adapt to the true nature of the world around you; don’t expect it to adapt to you
􀂃 Continually challenge and willingly amend your “best-loved ideas”
􀂃 Recognize reality even when you don’t like it – especially when you don’t like it
Focus – Keep things simple and remember what you set out to do
􀂃 Remember that reputation and integrity are your most valuable assets – and can be lost in a heartbeat
􀂃 Guard against the effects of hubris (arrogance) and boredom
􀂃 Don’t overlook the obvious by drowning in minutiae (the small details)
􀂃 Be careful to exclude unneeded information or slop: “A small leak can sink a great ship”
􀂃 Face your big troubles; don’t sweep them under the rug
In the end, it comes down to Charlie’s most basic guiding principles, his fundamental philosophy of life: Preparation. Discipline. Patience. Decisiveness.

Value Investing: From Graham to Buffett and Beyond’s Profile of Walter and Edwin Schloss Part 2

A few weeks ago, we talked Bruce Greenwald’s fantastic “Value Investing: From Graham to Buffett and Beyond” and the chapter and Walter and Edwin Schloss. We continue the second and final part of the series with this post.

“Edwin Schloss pays attention to asset values, but he is more willing to look at a company’s earnings power. He does want some asset protection. If he finds a cheap stock based on normalized earnings power, he generally will not consider it if he has to pay more than three times book value. “

  • We have noted in previous posts that when analyzing Schloss’ old holdings, there were some companies in the list that had never traded below 2.0x book. This finding, that Edwin Schloss, paid up a bit, jives with the data.
  • In my opinion, the key phrases in this quote: “Normalized Earnings” – Remember both Walter and Edwin Schloss like to go back at least 20 years in terms of financials. More often than not during that 20 year period there will be a couple of booms and busts (in terms of cycles). With that information in hand, you can look at where margins will fall in the steady state. I.E. You are not going to look at a homebuilder and use 2004 and 2005 volume and margin numbers to get a sense of normalized earnings power.
“When they begin to take a hard look at a new company, the Schlosses make sure to read the annual report thoroughly. The financial statements are important, no doubt, but so are the footnotes. They want to be certain there are no significant off-balance sheet liabilities. They look at the history of capital spending to see what conditions the fixed assets are in. A company that has a fully depreciated plant may be reporting higher earnings that a rival that has just completed a new factory, but if the rival has spent its money carefully, it is likely to have a more modern and efficient operation. Ten years of advertising expenses don’t show up on the balance sheet, but they do create some value for a brand, provided that the company knows how to exploit it. The Schlosses are looking for recovery potential. The stocks they buy have become cheap for a reason, and their success lies in their ability to form a sufficient accurate estimate of whether or not the market has overreacted.”

  • In my opinion, this is why the Schlosses can’t be called robots. They are not just picking statistically cheap stocks – they are looking for things the market may have missed or overreacted on. For instance, if a company has spent a significant amount of capital in the last few years their margins will be lower than an older company (depreciation schedules are different). This can cause companies to miss EPS numbers – something I am sure the Schlosses do not care about – when the market overreacts and the stock price falls over the “Schloss cliff” they are ready to pick it up on the cheap
  • Very good point about off balance sheet liabilities. For instance, a number of retailers carry very little corporate debt but a massive amount of operating leases which (in my opinion) need to be capitalized to get a better sense for the true leverage of a company
  • Remember – these stocks are cheap for a reason – your job as a value investor is to determine where the market is wrong.
“Because the Schlosses hold their positions on average for four or five years, they have time to become more familiar with the company. They continue to look at each quarterly report, but they do not obsess about day to day price swings or two-cents-per share earnings disappointments or positive surprises…Since everything about their approach orients them towards companies that are not in rapidly changing industries in which technological innovation may undermine value in weeks, if not days, they can afford to sit back and wait.”

  • Again, note the four to five year holding period.
  • As noted above, they care less about earnings misses.
  • Just like Buffett, the Schlosses tend to avoid technology. What I find interesting about this quote is if you look at the stock holdings of the Schlosses over the years there are a smattering of these sorts of companies (including bio tech). I’ll try to reconcile this in future posts.
“Still, when asked to name the mistake he makes most frequently, Edwin Schloss confesses to buying too much of the stock on the initial purchase and not leaving himself enough room to buy more when the price goes down. If it doesn’t drop after his first purchase, then he has made the right decision. But the chances are against him. He often does get the opportunity to average down – that is, to buy additional shares at a lower price. The Schlosses have been in the business too long to think that the stock will now oblige them and only rise in price. Investing is a humbling profession, but when decades of positive results confirm the wisdom of the strategy, humility is tempered by confidence”

  • In the book, the paragraph about the one noted above read: ”The disappointments or reduced expectations that have made it cheap are not going away any time soon…” This is so important: Too often investors will see a “Schloss Cliff” in a stock and start buying – it takes time for the market to digest certain information – why do you think the Schlosses hold for 4-5 year. In my opinion, current investors are far too impatient to try to mimic the successes of Walter and Edwin Schloss
  • I remember once reading that Walter will buy a small position to understand what it feels like to own a stock and then maybe own a 1/2 position after a certain time period – That gives me a lot of room to double up to make up as it were
“The decision to sell a stock that has not recovered requires more judgement that does selling a winner. At some point, everyone throws in the towel. For value investors like the Schlosses, the trigger will generally be a deterioration in the assets or earning power beyond what they had initially anticipated. The stock may still be cheap, but the prospects of recovery have now started to fade.”

  • This paragraph above is basically the deadly value trap that so many value investors struggle with. These value traps are almost always still cheap on any statistical basis – but either the business is deteriorating in some way not first anticipated or the margin of safety has eroded
  • Seth Klarman once wrote that when his thesis for an investment turns out to be wrong, he sells and re-evaluates. I hear similar sentiments from the paragraph above.
“The Schlosses run a diversified portfolio, but they do it without prescribed limits on the size of a position they will take. Though they may own 100 names, it is typical for the largest 20 positions to account for around 60 percent of the portfolio. They have occasionally had up to 20 percent of their fund in a single security, but that degree of concentration is a rarity. They are buying cheap stocks, we must remember, not great companies with golden futures…Diversification is a safeguard against uncertainty and an essential feature of the Schlosses’ successful strategy…Although they are not going to end up with a portfolio invested in one or two industries, they will overweight their holdings when they find cheap stocks clustered together in out-of-favor sectors. At times like these, they can pick the better companies within these discarded securities. If the price of a commodity such as copper has plummeted, then copper related stocks will be on sale…Companies with low costs that are not overburdened by debts are safe bets at these times, primarily because nobody wants to own them.”

  • Some great portfolio manager advice here: I’ve also noticed in running a portfolio that I will find cheap companies in one sector (for example, medical tech and defense are very cheap sectors right now). With that, my allocations will start clumping up – but because the investments I make (from an equity standpoint) run with very little leverage, I have confidence they will make it through to brighter prospects.
  • I might have mentioned this once on my other sites (or this one for that matter), but I once saw Carl Icahn speak about his strategy – he buys companies (via the debt) in beaten down industries – reduces leverage dramatically and wait for the cycle to turn – very similar to what Schloss is doing.
  • This diversification strategy is so Graham like – some investment will be terrible, but a few will be doubles and triples which more than make up for the losses.
  • So often the sell side looks 1 – 2 years in advance – If copper was dirt cheap, in some point in the future, it will become more valuable – as long as a company is not burdened by debt and can not burn cash flow (i.e. low cost), things will turn out alright.
Before closing up, my favorite quote from the chapter:

“It may also explain why the Schlosses do not disclose to their partners the names of the companies whose shares they own. In the main, they invest in unpresentable securities, stocks no one wants to brag about at cocktail parties or anywhere else.”

That is value investing to a tee – Unheard, unloved, hated names (with little debt remember).

For further reading on value investing with Walter and Edwin Schloss, please purchase the book. Or of course, check back for future value investing posts.

Joel Greenblatt's Recommended Reading List

in addition to being a great investor is also a professor at Columbia’s Business School. He teaches a class titled “Value and Special Situation Investing”.

The course as described as follows:

This course will review the basic elements of fundamental analysis and will provide practical experience in business valuation, value investing, special situation investing, risk arbitrage, option investments, risk assessment and portfolio management.

On the syllabus Greenblatt provides a list of required and recommended books. Below are a list of the books on the syllabus along with a brief description.

Greenwald Bruce
Value Investing: From Graham to Buffett and Beyond –– required. In my humble opinion this is one of the best books on value investing. Bruce Greenwald is also a professor at Columbia’s Business School, and director of research at First Eagle Funds.

Haugen Robert,
New Finance, The (4th Edition) –– required. Focuses on the evidence, causes, and history of over reactive pricing in the stock market. The book touches on topics like behavioral finance, and provides evidence that the market is not efficient.

Greenblatt, Joel,
You Can Be a Stock Market Genius –– required. Despite the book’s cheesy title there is a wealth of information here. The book focuses on special situations including arbitrage, bankruptcies and spinoffs. Similar to Seth klarman’s Margin of safety, this is probably the best book on special situation investing.

Greenblatt, Joel,
The Little Book That Still Beats the Market –– required. A very simple and quick read. The book discusses Joel Greenblatt’s famous magic formula. The formula calls for investing in companies that have high returns on capital and high earnings yield.

Cunningham, Lawrence,
The Essays of Warren Buffett –– required. A compilation of Berkshire Hathaway shareholder letters, all organized by topic. If you want to know about Buffett this might be the best book to start off with.

Hooke, Jeffery,
Security Analysis on Wall Street –– recommended. The book is a step-by-step explanation of how to analyze a stock. Hooke teaches the reader about intrinsic value, relative value and acquisition value.

O’Shaughnessy James,
What Works on Wall Street –– recommended. The author examines several decades of market data and shows how 15 of the most common investment tactics have fared over that time horizon.

Dreman David
Contrarian Investment Strategies - The Next Generation. –– recommended. This book is very undervalued in my opinion. Dreman discusses his contrarian approach to investing while ripping the efficient market theory along the way. This is one of my top five favorite investment books.

Thursday, October 7, 2010

Who Is the Better Stockpicker: Buffett or Paulson?

Two years ago, Warren Buffett and then-Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson each made significant investments in iconic Wall Street firms. The controversial deals—Buffett's in Goldman Sachs Group (NYSE: GS - News) and the Treasury Department's huge investment in Citigroup (NYSE: C - News)—were made out of different motivations, but both have made money.
If you had to guess which investment worked out better, would you go with Buffett? Investors have been well-served following the advice of the "Oracle of Omaha," and former Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson and his successor, Tim Geithner, haven't exactly been lauded by taxpayers for their shrewd deployment of capital. And in this tale of two trades, Buffett once again proved his savvy. Still, against all odds and predictions, the taxpayers have come out just fine on the Citi investment.
Oh How the Mighty Have Fallen
First, let's take Citigroup—please. The largest bank in the U.S. ran into plus-size troubles in the fall of 2008, having made every conceivable poor lending decision in the bankers' handbook. As a result, it received the largest aid package of all the banks.
In October 2008, the Bush administration's Treasury department bought $25 billion in preferred shares in Citi; at the same time it made similar investments in all the other largest banks, including Goldman ($10 billion). A few months later, having determined that Citi needed more help, Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson put another $20 billion into Citi, and then sold Citi insurance on a large chunk of its assets. In early 2009, this seemed like an enormous waste of public capital. As the economy contracted and Citi's losses mounted, the stock sunk to a low below $1 per share in March 2009.
Paulson engineered and timed the entry, but his successor, Timothy Geithner, engineered and timed the exit. Realizing that it would be difficult for Citi to raise $45 billion to pay back the taxpayers, Geithner agreed to convert the first $25 billion of aid into 7.7 billion shares of common stock in the summer of 2009, at a conversion price of $3.25 per share. The hope was that the government could slowly sell the shares into the markets over time while breaking even.
As the financial and credit markets reflated, Citi began to recover. In December 2009, Citi paid back the government's remaining $20 billion TARP investment and ended the guarantee program. In April 2010, the Treasury began to sell off the shares—at a decent profit. So far, it has sold 4.1 billion shares at an average price of $3.98 (22 percent above the conversion price), yielding $16.4 billion in cash. Details on the Citi stock sales can be seen here (on page 15). Last week, the Treasury also announced the sale of $2.25 billion in securities it had received from Citi as a premium for guaranteeing its assets.
Adding up the repayments and the stock sales, plus dividends, the Treasury says it has reaped $41.6 billion of the $45 billion it put into Citi. There's more to come: 3.6 billion shares of common stock (worth $14.6 billion), plus the upcoming sale of securities pledged to the Treasury ($800 million), plus the sale of warrants the Treasury received (about $1 billion). If market conditions hold (a big if) through the winter, the returns could add up to $58 billion, leaving taxpayers with a $13 billion profit. That's a 29 percent return in about two and a half years. Not bad.
But it might have come out better if Paulson had outsourced the dealmaking to Buffett. In September 2008, at about the same time the Treasury was preparing the TARP investments, Warren Buffett made a complicated $5 billion investment in Goldman Sachs. Buffett extracted much better terms from Henry Paulson's former employer than Paulson was able to extract from Goldman and the other banks.
While banks participating in the TARP were only asked to pay a five percent dividend, Buffett secured a 10 percent annual dividend on his Goldman preferred shares. As a sweetener, he received warrants to buy 43.5 million shares of Goldman common stock at a strike price of $115 for five years. What's more, if Goldman wants to retire the shares, it must pay Buffett a 10 percent premium.
So how has Berkshire Hathaway done on this deal? In two years, Berkshire has collected dividends of $1 billion on the $5 billion investment. At today's market prices, the warrants are worth about $2.2 billion, according to options professionals. That's a 64 percent (paper) return in two years. And that's not even considering any increase in the value of the preferred shares, which had a fair value of $3.86 billion when they were issued, according to Goldman's quarterly report (see page 122).
Given his track record, it's not surprising that Buffett was able to capitalize on the chaos on Wall Street and rack up better returns than one of the few entities with deeper pockets than him. But there are a couple of points worth considering. First, Buffett's bet was purely economic; the Treasury was focused more on saving the system (however clumsily) vs. booking a profit.
Second, Buffett's bet worked out in large measure because of the extraordinary assistance Goldman received: cheap capital through TARP, billions in credit default insurance funneled to it through AIG, and FDIC guarantees on debt that it issued.
What's more, investors who followed Buffett's lead by buying Goldman's common shares in the fall of 2008 haven't done quite as well. Buffeted by challenges in the capital markets, new regulation, and a SEC investigation, Goldman's stock has essentially moved sideways over the past two years. While Goldman weathered the crisis better than its peers and rivals, many of them have done a better job in this recovery—including Citi. In fact, since the market lows of March 2009, Citi, a bank in which the government has a major ownership stake, has significantly outperformed the firm often known as "Government Sachs."

Tuesday, October 5, 2010

Warren Buffett: 'Quite Clear Stocks Are Cheaper Than Bonds'

Warren Buffett says it is "quite clear stocks are cheaper than bonds" right now, but notes that relationship will change eventually when confidence in the economy is inevitably restored.
In an appearance earlier today (Tuesday) at the Fortune Most Powerful Women Conference in Washington, Buffett said he "can't imagine" choosing bonds over stocks at current prices, but concedes that's what many investors have been doing because of a "lack of confidence" in the economy's future.  "They're making a mistake, the ones that are buying the bonds" at record low yields.

In this video clip, he tells Fortune's Carol Loomis:
"It's quite clear that stocks are cheaper than bonds. I can't imagine anybody having bonds in their portfolio when they can own equities, a diversified group of equities. But people do because they, the lack of confidence. But that's what makes for the attractive prices. If they had their confidence back, they wouldn't be selling at these prices. And believe me, it will come back over time."
It's not a new opinion for Buffett.  Back in early 2009, he was writing about an "extraordinary" U.S. Treasury bond "bubble."
Fortune's Street Sweep blog points out that the 10-year Treasury yield has dropped to under 2.5 percent from 4 percent over the past six months.
FDIC Chairwoman Sheila Bair told CNBC there "a bit of a bond bubble now", longtime bond bull Goldman Sachs believes bonds have peaked and will be heading lower from here, and Pimco's Steve Rodosky tells Dow Jones today that "the best day in Treasurys is probably behind us."  He hasn't bought them since July.